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Assessing the performance of supply chains from a smallholder perspective: 
A model of farmer-buyer engagement and its application in Nepal 
Salil Bhattarai1, Michael Lyne2 and Sandra Martin3 
Abstract 
This study considers supply chain performance from the perspective of smallholders. It 
draws on Transaction Cost Economics to develop a model explaining dyadic relationships 
between smallholders and their buyers. The model extends the traditional vertical 
coordination continuum to incorporate missing dyads and informal markets. It aims to 
identify factors that constrain marketing choices available to smallholders, limiting the 
chain’s robustness from their perspective. The model is used to analyse the supply chain for 
organic fresh vegetables in Kathmandu, Nepal, and to derive policy recommendations from 
the analysis. This chain is characterised mainly by relational contracting between 
smallholders and their immediate buyers. There was also evidence of vertical integration by 
some buyers, and of growers selling on informal markets. However, there was no evidence 
of spot market trading or of conventional contracting. Despite this, the chain offered 
smallholders a range of dyads with different risk-reward trade-offs. It is concluded that 
government agencies could play a key role in building a more robust chain by helping these 
parties to deepen and extend their relational contracts, by establishing standards and rules 
for organic produce traded in municipal spot markets, and by facilitating farmer marketing 
groups and advising them on production plans, technology and participatory guarantee 
systems. The government could also improve physical infrastructure, mandate extension 
staff to facilitate and witness contracts, and provide contractual parties with easy access to 
legal recourse for small claims.  
Key words: Small farmers, markets, transaction costs, farmer-buyer dyads, vertical 
coordination, organic vegetables  
1 Introduction  
Agriculture remains a major source of livelihood for most of the rural poor in developing 
countries (World Bank, 2007). Smallholders need higher incomes to cope with rising prices 
of food and basic services. Linking smallholders to markets will play a critical role in 
                                                          
1 PhD student, Lincoln University, New Zealand. 
2 Associate Professor, Lincoln University, New Zealand and Honorary Professor, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 
South Africa. 
3 Associate Professor, Lincoln University, New Zealand. 
 
Draft full paper version 20/08/2012    
 
 
Paper prepared for the DevNet conference, University of Auckland, Auckland, 3-5 December, 2012 
  2 
 
sustaining their livelihoods and promoting both rural and urban food security (Wheatley & 
Peters, 2004).  
Linkages between producers and markets are becoming increasingly coordinated to meet 
growing demands for high quality, safe food. Such shifts are seldom beneficial to 
smallholders who struggle to meet the costs imposed by these demands (Markelova, 
Meinzen-Dick, Hellin, & Dohrn, 2009; Pingali, Khwaja, & Meijer, 2005; Poulton, Kydd, & 
Dorward, 2006; Shepherd, 2007; Vorley, Lundy, & MacGregor, 2009). It is therefore 
important to identify ways of maintaining and promoting smallholder engagement in food 
supply chains. However, literature relating to chain performance (Aramyan, 2007; Brewer & 
Speh, 2000; Cadilhon, Fearne, Giac Tam, Moustier, & Poole, 2006; Chan & Qi, 2003; Chen & 
Paulraj, 2004; Gunasekaran, Patel, & McGaughey, 2004; Lohman, Fortuin, & Wouters, 2004) 
focusses on whole chain issues and seldom considers performance from a smallholder 
perspective. 
This study takes the smallholder view and explores the ability of supply chains to sustain 
smallholder engagement. It focuses on the dyad between growers and their immediate 
buyers, and applies the axiom that a chain is robust if it has one or more dyads that sustain 
smallholder engagement. A chain that offers smallholders a range of such dyads, each with 
its own risk-reward profile, is considered to be more robust than one that offers 
smallholders few marketing choices.  
The paper draws on Transaction Cost Economics (Hobbs, 1996; Williamson, 1979, 1985) to 
develop a model explaining dyadic relationships between smallholders and their buyers 
(Section 2), and uses this model to analyse a case study of the supply chain for organic fresh 
vegetables in Kathmandu (Section 3). The model extends the traditional vertical 
coordination continuum to incorporate missing dyads and informal markets. The aim of the 
analysis is to identify what dyads are (or are not) used by smallholders and to explain why 
they are (or are not) used by them. The purpose of the analysis is to identify effective ways 
of improving chain robustness from the smallholder perspective (Section 4).   
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2  A model to analyse smallholder supply chains 
Shepherd (2007) describes some of the common marketing channels used by small farmers. 
Each channel starts with a farmer-buyer dyad. A dyad is not sustainable unless it generates 
acceptable levels of risk and reward for the buyer and seller (Lee, 2004; Narayanan & 
Raman, 2004). Supply chains that comprise several different marketing channels can offer 
smallholders more choice in their search for acceptable levels of risk and reward. For the 
purpose of this study, a chain is considered to be robust if it provides smallholders with one 
or more sustainable dyads. Hence, the wider is the choice of sustainable smallholder-buyer 
dyads, the more robust is the chain.  
Transaction cost economics provides useful insights into dyadic relationships. Hobbs (1996) 
defines transaction costs as the costs of carrying out any exchange. Williamson (1985, pp. 
20-21) distinguishes between ex ante and ex post transaction costs. Ex ante transaction 
costs are mostly fixed costs associated with the search for trading partners and negotiation 
of agreements. Ex post transaction costs are those associated with monitoring and enforcing 
agreements, and with the risk of losses caused by a breach of contract. Ex post transaction 
costs are largely variable costs that increase with the volume transacted. Pingali, Khwaja, & 
Meijer (2005) note that transaction costs could be specific to buyers, suppliers, location and 
the crop. 
2.1 Drivers of transaction costs 
Asset specific investment, uncertainty surrounding transactions, and frequency of 
transactions increase transaction costs (Williamson, 1979; 1985, pp. 52-61). Complexity is 
also viewed as contributing to transaction costs (Hobbs & Young, 2001; Jaffee, 1995b; 
Poulton & Lyne, 2009).  
Asset specificity 
Asset specificity arises when a trading partner invests in assets that have little or no value in 
an alternative use (Hobbs, 1996). Such investment may be specific to a relationship or a 
group of potential relationships. Asset specific investment exposes the investor to risk of 
hold-up that can be exploited opportunistically unless appropriate contractual safeguards 
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are designed (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978). From a farmer perspective, Jaffee (1995a) 
notes that asset specificity arises from the gestation period of the crop, and the degree of 
specialisation of production technique and knowledge.  
Uncertainty 
Uncertainty refers to unanticipated changes in the circumstances surrounding a transaction. 
Such changes may arise due to environmental or behavioural risks (Jaffee, 1995b). 
Environmental risk arises when suppliers are otherwise trustworthy but cannot honour the 
terms of trade for reasons that are beyond their control; for example, unfavourable weather 
may prevent farmers from fulfilling supply contracts. Such outcomes are frequently 
observed in trading relationships with small scale farmers because they do not have the 
capital, technical skills and technologies to mitigate adverse changes in farming conditions 
(Vorley et al., 2009). Producers might also face uncertainty in finding a buyer if products are 
of idiosyncratic quality (Hobbs & Young, 2001). 
Behavioural risk arises when a contracting party alters its behaviour after a contract has 
been agreed. Pervasive opportunism, which is defined by Williamson (1985, p. 47) as self-
interest seeking with guile, manifests as a lack of trust. Side-selling and price manipulation 
are perhaps some of the more common symptoms of opportunism in relationships between 
smallholders and their buyers. The presence of opportunism gives rise to transaction costs 
in the form of monitoring behaviour, safeguarding assets, losses caused by a breach of 
contract, and contract enforcement (Grover & Malhotra, 2003). 
Complexity 
Perishability, specificity of quality standards, seasonality of supply and traceability 
requirements increase the complexity of transactions (Jaffee, 1995b; Poulton & Lyne, 2009). 
Complexity increases transaction costs by increasing the uncertainty of supply, by increasing 
information and monitoring costs (Hobbs & Young, 2001; Jaffee, 1995b), by increasing the 
need for assets that have little value in alternative uses, and by increasing the cost of 
renegotiating (incomplete) contracts ex post (Poulton & Lyne, 2009). 
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Frequency 
Transaction costs are also expected to increase with the frequency of transactions. 
However, frequency should not be confused with recurrence. Recurrent transactions involve 
the same trading partner and could reflect a lack of alternative trading parties or an attempt 
to avoid high transaction costs associated with frequent transactions. Williamson (1985, p. 
60) argues that the cost of specialised governance structures will be easier to recover for 
large transactions of a recurring kind.  
Size 
Although transaction costs increase as the volume traded increases, they decline relative to 
the value of the transaction. For small farmers transacting small quantities, aggregate 
transaction, compliance and marketing costs can easily exceed the value of their 
transaction. Vorley et al. (2009) note that inadequate infrastructure and support services in 
developing countries tend to accentuate this problem, and there is mounting evidence that 
smallholders are being increasingly excluded from agri-business supply chains by rising 
transaction and compliance costs associated with demands for a continuous supply of safe, 
value added food products (Batt & Cadilhon, 2006; Pingali et al., 2005; Reardon, Timmer, & 
Berdeque, 2005). Collective marketing can reduce these costs but introduces other costs 
that may prevent market participation (Lyne & Martin, 2008). 
Information and power 
Vulnerability to opportunism may increase due to information asymmetry regarding 
intentions and capabilities of trading partners, and the attributes of the product traded 
(Dorward, 2001; Hobbs & Young, 2001; Jaffee, 1995b; North, 1991). Opportunism may also 
arise due to power asymmetry between buyers and sellers in the supply chain (Ganesan, 
1994; Heide & John, 1988; Vorley et al., 2009). Woods (2004) argues that power is related to 
dependency created by a lack of alternatives. Information and power asymmetry provide 
incentives for more informed and powerful agents to extract undue benefits from 
transactions, or to pass excessive risk to their transaction partners. Perceptions that risks 
and rewards are not distributed fairly between trading partners tend to discourage 
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participation by ‘weaker’ agents, undermining the sustainability of dyads and the robustness 
of chains (Lee, 2004; Preckel, Gray, Boehlje, & Kim, 2004).  
2.2 Transaction costs and the nature of transactions 
The factors that influence high transaction costs not only help to explain the presence or 
absence of farmer-buyer dyads but also help to explain the mode of engagement between 
farmers and buyers where dyads do exist. Observed dyads are often categorised according 
to their level of coordination, ranging from spot market through different forms of 
contracting to vertical integration (Frank & Henderson, 1992; Hobbs, 1996). The principal 
motive for this progression from ‘loose’ to ‘tight’ vertical coordination is the desire to  avoid 
high transaction costs (Frank & Henderson, 1992; Hobbs, 1996; Williamson, 1979; 1985, pp. 
129-130; 1991). Consequently, the mode of engagement between transacting parties will be 
influenced by the drivers of transaction costs (Williamson, 1985, pp. 52-61).  
This traditional continuum of vertical coordination from spot market to vertical integration 
tends to ignore the distinction between spot markets and informal markets. Price is often 
viewed as the only coordinating mechanism needed to facilitate impersonal transactions 
between multiple buyers and sellers in spot markets (Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005; 
Hobbs, 1996). However, North (1990) contends that spot markets are coordinated by strong 
institutions that allow traders to compete purely on price. Poulton & Lyne (2009) note that 
‘near perfect’ spot markets, like commodity exchanges,  can focus on price alone thanks to 
well-defined standards and rules enforced by private or public agencies. This is entirely 
different from informal markets that lack the benefit of such coordinating institutions. In a 
smallholder context, such markets tend to be patronised by small numbers of buyers and 
sellers engaging in highly personalised cash transactions in order to reduce their exposure to 
opportunism. In addition, the traditional vertical coordination continuum does not explicitly 
account for the absence of transactions. Figure 1 models vertical coordination as a 
continuum that progresses from ‘no-transaction’ to the informal market, spot market, 
contracting and vertical integration. The model highlights relationships between the drivers 
of transaction costs and modes of engagement between sellers and buyers, recognising that 
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the absence of transactions provides valuable information about what it might take to 
create sustainable dyads. 
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Figure 1: Modes of engagement between farmers and buyers  
In Figure 1, the ‘no-transaction’ segment refers to missing dyads where producers or buyers 
are either unwilling or unable to transact. Following the logic of TCE, this extreme outcome 
could reflect prohibitively high unit transaction costs (Benham & Benham, 2000) and could 
well be characterised by weak physical and legal infrastructure, poor services, small and 
volatile marketable surpluses, high levels of distrust and the absence of farmer 
organisations to facilitate joint bargaining and marketing. Some of these attributes might be 
readily observable, while deeper and more qualitative studies would be required to 
establish the presence or absence of others.  
The ‘informal market’ segment is analogous to the thin market described by Dorward, Kydd, 
Poulton, & Bezemer (2009) where prices are not discovered through competition owing to 
small numbers of buyers and sellers. In the informal market, individual buyers and sellers 
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trade small quantities of surplus products that have inconsistent supply and quality – 
especially in the case of perishable products that must be harvested and sold frequently. In 
the absence of standards, rules and reliable information, unit transaction costs tend to be 
high and participants often resort to personalised and cash-based transactions in order to 
reduce their exposure to opportunism. 
In contrast, ‘spot market’ segment is characterised by effective standards, rules and 
information flows that help to reduce participant transaction costs. Consequently, these 
markets can draw large numbers of buyers and sellers who compete on price for 
standardised products and services. Transactions tend to be impersonal without any 
commitment to engage in repeat transactions. Dyer & Singh (1998) contend that such 
exchange is seldom characterised by asset specific investment. From a smallholder 
perspective, well-managed fresh produce markets operated by town and city municipalities 
may approximate spot markets. 
The ‘conventional contracting’ segment in Figure 1 refers to contracts that specify terms 
agreed ex ante relating to duration, quantity, quality and price, and that are formalised in 
writing to facilitate external legal enforcement. Williamson (1979), elaborating on Macneil’s 
work, distinguishes between classical and neo-classical contracting. Classical contracting is 
an efficient form of governance when all contingencies are known ex ante and efficient legal 
remedies are available. On the other hand, neo-classical contracting accepts that contracts 
are incomplete and that third-party arbitration may be required to address unforeseen 
contingencies. In either case, conventional contracting is characterised by ready access to 
external enforcement in a market burdened with environmental and behavioural risk.  
The ‘relational contracting’ segment refers to written or verbal contracts relying on mutual 
promise between transactors. Relational contracts possess many implicit and some explicit 
terms, which are open to ex post adaptations to unforeseen circumstances. These contracts 
emerge when there is a threat of hold-up to asset-specific investment for mutually 
beneficial value-adding, and external enforcement is costly or impractical due primarily to 
incomplete and complex contracts. Under such conditions, investors seek assurance for the 
continuity of trade in order to recoup investments by devising internal enforcement 
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mechanisms. The ‘promise’ as a contracting process in the absence of opportunism 
(Williamson, 1985, p. 31) rarely exists in a real world situation. In reality, such contracts are 
backed with internal enforcement measures such as shared investment in specific assets, 
incentive payments and the threat of losing reputational capital and repeat business 
opportunities. These internal methods of addressing opportunism often appear to manifest 
as trust in relational contracting. Relational contracts are also characterised by strong 
information exchanges (Dwyer, Schurr, & Oh, 1987; Dyer & Singh, 1998) as there is a need 
to continually adapt incomplete and complex contracts.  
Vertical integration is an extreme form of vertical coordination and refers to integration by 
buyers and suppliers into upstream or downstream functions instead of trading with 
another party. Vertical integration arises when integrators see clear benefits in trade but are 
constrained by prohibitively high transaction costs (Coase, 1937; Frank & Henderson, 1992; 
Hobbs, 1996; Williamson, 1979; 1985, pp. 85-102). However, vertical integration is not 
immune to environmental uncertainty and these management-based transactions may also 
fail to materialise. Common outcomes of vertical integration in agricultural chains are 
backward integration by buyers into production and forward integration by producers into 
processing. Another mode of vertical integration is joint equity investment by buyers and 
sellers in a single firm. Williamson (1979) argues that the advantage of vertical integration 
lies in quicker adaptation without the need to negotiate, revise or enforce inter-firm 
agreements. Enforcement in vertical integration is via managerial control (Gereffi et al., 
2005). 
3 An empirical application of the model  
3.1 Research approach and data collection  
Several smallholder supply chains in Nepal were examined as part of a wider PhD study, but 
this paper analyses only the chain for organic fresh vegetables in Kathmandu. Data were 
gathered from June to July 2011 using the case study method suggested by Yin (2009, pp. 
99-126). The case comprised producers, their buyers, potential buyers and supporting 
government and non-government agencies. The unit of analysis was the farmer-buyer dyad, 
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and producers and (potential) buyers were treated as sub-units in the embedded case study 
design. 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with producers, buyers, potential buyers and 
staff of government and non-government organisations. Interviews were recorded, 
transcribed and coded using NVivo software to facilitate data retrieval and analysis. The 
analysis followed the approach recommended by Trochim (1989), Yin (2009, pp. 136-144) 
and Babbie (2004, pp. 370-371) of searching for patterns in the data and comparing or 
contrasting observed patterns with those predicted by theory. In this way, theoretical 
propositions (such as those summarised by the model illustrated in Figure 1) can be 
confirmed or rejected. If rejected, the data may suggest alternative propositions, shifting 
the focus of the analysis to ‘theory building’.  
Figure 2 outlines the process used to analyse the data. First, existing and missing dyads were 
identified. Missing dyads included past dyads that were no longer evident and the dyads 
between producers and potential buyers that were not operating. Next, these existing and 
potential dyads were matched with those represented by the segments of the model in 
Figure 1. Propositions about the drivers of transaction costs were then checked against the 
data, and insights revealed by this process were used to inform recommendations aimed at 
making existing dyads more sustainable and creating new dyads to broaden the range of 
market channels available to smallholders. 
Identify existing and missing dyads
Match observed and missing dyads with postulated modes of engagement
Test propositions about the drivers of transaction costs in observed and missing dyads
Recommend policy or management interventions to open new, sustainable dyads 
Robust chain
 
Figure 2: Process used to analyse the supply chain 
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3.2 A description of the organic fresh vegetable supply chain in Kathmandu 
The organic vegetable supply chain is a relatively new chain and includes a range of fresh 
vegetables. Precise data are not available on the market share of organic vegetables but it is 
considered to be very small. The aim of this study is not to provide a full account of organic 
vegetable marketing in Kathmandu but to provide insight into the nature of relationships 
between producers and their buyers in the case study. The case comprises interviews with 
six farmers, two immediate buyers (an ‘organic wholesaler’ and an ‘organic retailer’), a 
supermarket, a premium class tourist hotel, an extension officer and an NGO employee. In 
this paper, the terms ‘farmers’ and ‘buyers’ refer only to these case study respondents and 
not to all farmers and buyers engaged in the chain of organic vegetable. 
The farmers operate in the Kathmandu valley, between 10 and 25km from the city centre. 
They had been farming organically for the past three to eight years, and most of them 
produced conventional vegetables before converting to organic farming methods. Five of 
the six farmers are owner-operators but one is a tenant who rents land. Other farm 
enterprises included dairy, poultry, goats and apiculture. The farms are accessible by public 
transport and are mostly less than an hour’s walk from all-weather roads. Modern 
telecommunications like mobile phones and the internet are also accessible in the area. The 
farmers and their immediate buyers are located close to each other, as are buyers and end 
consumers further down the supply chain.  
Figure 3 illustrates observed linkages between farmers and markets (solid arrows) as well as 
potential marketing channels (dotted arrows). Four distinct market dyads (Table 1) were 
observed in the case study. These dyads showed marked differences in contract type, 
methods used to determine product prices, information exchange, levels of asset-specific 
investment by buyers, and the presence or absence of horizontal coordination amongst 
farmers. 
The transaction between the organic wholesaler and his supplier (farmer 1) is based on a 
written annual contact. Prices are fixed at a level negotiated at the beginning of each 
season. Quality and volumes are mentioned in the contract but volumes are not fixed owing 
to potential variation in yield and changes in market conditions. The wholesaler specialises 
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in organic trade and had made asset specific investments in branding and knowledge. The 
farmer and wholesaler meet occasionally to discuss problems and opportunities. The 
wholesaler also provides extension advice when requested by the farmer. Payments are 
supposed to be made weekly, but were often delayed. The farmer occasionally sources 
product from another farmer (farmer 4) to meet anticipated volumes. The wholesaler also 
sources organic vegetables from other organic farmers and producer groups. A supermarket 
retails the wholesaler’s supplies, charging a commission of 15 per cent.  
Producers/Producer group or 
cooperative
Organic 
wholesaler
Organic 
retailer
Consumers
Conventional 
retailers /street 
vendor Restaurant
Farm
Hotel
Farm
Supermarket
Existing linkage
Potential linkage
Vertical 
integration
 
Figure 3: Organic vegetable supply chain observed in the case study 
The organic retailer sources fresh vegetables from four suppliers (farmers 1, 2, 3, and 5). 
The retailer sources individually from farmer 1 but collectively from the other farmers via 
their cooperative. He has a written contract with farmer 1 and verbal contract with the 
cooperative. In either case, prices are linked to wholesale prices at the (conventional) wet 
market and the retailer pays agreed premiums on those prices. Quantities are not 
mentioned in the contract, but quality standards are specified at the outset. The retailer 
does not provide any extension advice to farmers. The retailer trades exclusively in organic 
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produce and had also opened a restaurant offering organic cuisine. Information sharing 
between farmers and the retailer is confined to prices and quantities of vegetables. In this 
dyad too, payments are supposed to be made weekly, but were often delayed.  
Table 1: Characteristics of existing farmer-buyer dyads 
Characteristics 
Organic 
wholesaler 
dyad 
Organic retailer 
dyad 
Conventional 
retailer and 
street vendor 
dyads 
Producer-
consumer dyad 
Contract Written annual 
Written and 
verbal 
Verbal None 
Contract with Individual 
Individual and 
group 
Individual Individual 
Price  Fixed 
Premium on wet 
market 
wholesale price 
Discount on 
retail price of 
conventional 
produce 
Premium on 
retail price of 
conventional 
produce 
Payment 
Weekly (often 
delayed) 
Weekly  (often 
delayed) 
Next day 
At the time of 
transaction 
Extension advice 
from buyer 
Yes No No No 
Finance by 
buyer 
No No No No 
Asset specific 
investment by 
the buyer 
Yes Yes No No 
Information 
exchange 
Occasionally 
meet to discuss 
problems and 
opportunities 
Limited 
interaction 
Information 
exchange 
limited to price 
and quantity 
None 
Next buyer Supermarket 
Consumers and 
Restaurant co-
owned by the 
buyer 
Consumers - 
 
The largest farmer (farmer 6) sells most of his produce to conventional retailers. Prices are 
negotiated at a level slightly below retail market prices, and the retailers sell organic 
vegetables at prices slightly higher than the retail prices of their conventional counterparts. 
Farmer 4 sells to a vendor operating at a popular street market. The vendor pays him the 
selling price less his margin. In these dyads, payment is made the day after the retailers sell 
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the produce. Although conventional retailers do differentiate organic produce, it accounts 
for only a small share of their fresh produce sales. None of these buyers had made any asset 
specific investment in organic trade, and information sharing was limited to product prices 
and quantities. Farmers tended to take the lead these dyads, delivering to the buyers and 
bearing the risk of unsold produce. 
Farmers 4 and 6 also sell produce directly to consumers at the farm-gate. Farmer 6 is very 
close to the city and the volume sold directly to consumers is substantial. Farmers set the 
price slightly higher than the retail price of conventional produce. Many of the consumers 
are regular customers. Nevertheless, payments are made immediately and in cash. 
In addition to these market dyads, there was evidence of buyers (the organic retailer and 
tourist hotel) integrating vertically into organic vegetable production. There was also 
evidence of broken relationships between a cooperative and a supermarket, and between a 
farmer and a specialised organic asparagus buyer and the organic retailer. 
3.3 Chain analysis and discussion 
3.3.1 Observed and potential dyads 
Farmers close to densely populated residential areas sell part of their produce directly to 
consumers. In these dyads, producers anticipate a premium on the prevailing retail price of 
conventional produce, and transactions are personalised and cash-based to avoid 
behavioural risk. Even so, there is no interdependence between buyer and seller.  
The conventional retailer and street vendor dyads do not involve ex ante negotiation of 
price and volume. It is implicitly agreed that price will be based on the retail price of 
conventional produce and that farmers will bear the risk of unsold produce. Although these 
dyads involve recurrent transactions, mutual interdependence is weak because organic 
produce constitutes a small share of the fresh produce sold by conventional retailers and 
the vendor does not differentiate between organic and conventional produce. Information 
exchange between producers and these buyers occurs only at the time of trade. Late or 
incomplete payment is sanctioned by withholding supplies to the buyer.  
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The organic retailer dyad also does not involve ex ante negotiation of price and volume. 
However, it is explicitly agreed that a certain premium will be applied to the wet market 
wholesale price. Volumes and prices are agreed when orders are placed. The retailer and 
producers engage in recurrent transactions and are mutually interdependent as the retailer 
trades exclusively in organic produce. However, the retailer is more dependent on 
producers than are producers on the retailer as there are alternative buyers and limited 
sources of supply. Information sharing is not particularly strong because the retailer and 
producers interact only at the time of ordering and delivering produce. Producers sanction 
the retailer for late or incomplete payment by withholding supplies, and the retailer 
sanctions farmers who side-sell or who deliver sub-standard produce by removing them 
from his preferred suppliers list.  
The organic wholesaler dyad involves considerable ex ante negotiation regarding price and 
volume, but allows for ex post adaptation of volume due to yield risk. This dyad is also 
characterised by recurrent transactions and mutual interdependence due to the buyer’s 
specialisation in organic produce. Again, the wholesaler is more dependent on producers 
than are producers on the wholesaler as there are alternative buyers and limited sources of 
supply. Information sharing is fairly strong in this dyad because the wholesaler provides 
extension advice (when consulted) and occasionally organises formal meetings with 
producers. The contract enforcement mechanism is similar to that in the organic retailer 
dyad. 
All of the dyads involving intermediaries (conventional or organic buyers) rely on internal 
contract enforcement. They all represent forms of relational contracting yet differ in their 
degree of ex ante negotiation, explicit contractual terms, frequency and type of information 
exchanged, and mutual interdependence. In Figure 4, the organic wholesaler dyad is located 
towards the upper end of the relational contracting segment as it is characterised by mutual 
interdependence and a relatively high level of information sharing. The conventional retailer 
and street vendor dyads are characterised by low levels of mutual interdependence and 
information sharing and therefore occupy the lower end of this segment. The organic 
retailer dyad positions itself between these two dyad types.  
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-The organic 
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Figure 4: Observed modes of engagement and their drivers 
The hotel and organic retailer both developed organic farms of their own, which fits into the 
vertical integration segment of Figure 4. The organic retailer still sources most of his supply 
from producers, but the backward integration into production by the hotel effectively 
excluded other growers from participating in this dyad. The potential farmer-hotel dyad is 
therefore located in the ‘no-transaction’ segment, along with discontinued dyads between a 
cooperative and a supermarket, and between a farmer and a specialised asparagus buyer. 
Figure 4 emphasises the dominant role that relational contracting appears to play in 
Kathmandu’s supply chain for fresh organic vegetables. Spot markets and conventional 
contracting are both missing. 
3.3.2 Dyad drivers 
Producers included in the case study were located within Kathmandu valley, enjoyed similar 
levels of physical and legal infrastructure, similar access to extension and credit services, 
and farmed the same products. The frequency of transactions was high in all dyads because 
vegetables are perishable and produced year-round. All producers made substantial asset-
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specific investments in production infrastructure and in acquiring specialised knowledge. 
Power asymmetry was not an issue for smallholders in this chain due to the presence of 
alternative buyers. There is some variation in these transaction-cost drivers (due primarily 
to distance from Kathmandu) and their impacts on chain performance are the subject of a 
future paper that compares supply chains for different products in different parts of Nepal.  
Participating in the informal market segment involved little complexity for farmers and 
consumers who visited the farms. Consumers purchase what farmers offer, pay in cash and 
do not seek proof of organic compliance. Search, negotiation and monitoring costs are 
particularly low for farmers. This meant that farmers could transact small quantities in the 
informal market without any need for collective action to reduce their unit transaction 
costs. Transaction costs are higher for consumers, and increase with distance from the 
growers. Of the two farmers participating in the informal market, one located very close to 
the city sells a sizeable volume of produce through this channel. This dyad appears to exist 
due primarily to low transaction costs associated with easy physical access and low 
complexity of transactions. 
Given the prevailing infrastructure and transport services, physical access tends to diminish 
sharply with increasing distance between consumers and farmers. Commercial growers 
therefore required alternatives to the informal market in order to sell produce in excess of 
the small volumes purchased at the farm gate by neighbouring consumers. However, spot 
markets and conventional contracting did not feature amongst the alternatives used by 
smallholders producing organic vegetables. The wholesale market operated by the 
Department of Agriculture provided the physical infrastructure for trading, but did not 
enforce the rules and standards required to differentiate organic produce. As a result, the 
wholesale market does not compensate farmers for asset specific investments in organic 
production methods, nor does it meet the specific requirements of ‘organic consumers’. The 
absence of a spot market for organic fresh vegetables can therefore be attributed partly to 
high transaction costs associated with asset specificity and complexity. 
Conventional contracts usually come with specific terms of trade regarding volume, quality, 
delivery and price. Although farmers had invested in plastic houses and irrigation to 
Draft full paper version 20/08/2012    
 
 
Paper prepared for the DevNet conference, University of Auckland, Auckland, 3-5 December, 2012 
  18 
 
alleviate environmental risk, this technology did not give them sufficient protection from 
unfavourable weather, pests and disease to consistently meet the terms of conventional 
contracts. Under these conditions, improved access to the legal system would do little to 
encourage conventional contracting, a view reinforced by the following statement: 
“Initially a fix-priced contract was tried. However, it failed due to fluctuation in 
market price and the organic retailer switched to a price linked to wholesale market 
price” (farmer 2).  
However, there was also an element of behavioural risk because farmers were averse to 
losing potential income when market price exceeded the contracted price: 
 “I have encountered several cases of farmers not willing to supply at the contracted 
price. I do not think the legal option of contract enforcement will work in ensuring 
supplies” (organic retailer). 
This statement suggests that buyers lacked access to an affordable and efficient legal 
system, and helps to explain why most organic fresh vegetables are sold via relational 
contracts. All dyads clustered in the relational contracting segment of Figure 4 involved 
recurrent transactions. The conventional retailer and street vendor dyads were positioned 
in the lower band of relational contracting and so were closer to the informal market, due to 
low switching costs for buyers, as these buyers did not make any asset specific investment 
in organic trade. These dyads were perceived to offer quicker payment and prices higher 
than (or at least comparable to) those offered by specialised organic buyers.  
“I sell to conventional retailers at a price slightly lower than the retail price. This price 
is higher than the price offered by organic buyers” (farmer 6).  
Transactions were also less complex because the buyers did not specify a delivery schedule 
or quality and compliance requirements. The conventional retailers and the street vendor 
did not reject supplies from producers as they did not bear the risk of unsold produce. 
The organic retailer had made asset specific investments in branding and in an organic 
restaurant. Quality and delivery standards were more specific in this dyad than in 
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conventional retailer dyads. The organic retailer did not insist on formal organic 
certification, but asked farmers for a letter of commitment stating that they would not use 
inorganic chemicals and fertilisers. He offered a premium on the wholesale market price to 
discourage farmers from side-selling when market prices were bullish. However, weak 
information sharing often resulted in scarcity of one product and abundance of another.  
“Production of some vegetables is beyond the capacity of organic buyers to absorb. 
As a result, we have to sell surplus organic produce in the wet market. On the other 
hand, we cannot supply the required volume of some other products. Joint planning 
of production is not practiced yet. I think the buyer is not too interested in supporting 
farmers to plan production in accordance with consumer demand” (farmer 2). 
“If everyone produces cabbage, how can the market absorb so much cabbage? My 
customers are looking for a variety of fresh organic products for their kitchens” 
(organic retailer). 
The organic wholesaler had made asset specific investments in branding, in acquiring 
knowledge and in providing extension advice to farmers. Transactions in this dyad were 
relatively complex as the wholesaler required consistent delivery and specified terms for 
product quality and organic compliance, possibly because he supplied a supermarket. The 
wholesaler rewarded compliance with a bonus payment, provided extension advice (when 
consulted) and organised meetings with producers. These interactions helped to strengthen 
the organic wholesaler’s relationships with farmers. 
“I have more contact with the organic wholesaler. He gives due recognition to 
farmers and their efforts” (farmer 1).  
The small size of the informal market and the absence of spot markets and conventional 
contracting meant that relational contracting was the only option for most farmers. 
Premiums, bonus payments and recurrent transactions facilitated internal enforcement of 
these relational contracts, reducing transaction costs associated with asset specificity and 
behavioural risk. When buyers made asset specific investments (the organic wholesaler and 
the organic retailer dyads) they also took the lead role in coordinating the dyad. In the 
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absence of asset specific investment by buyers (conventional retailers and the street vendor 
dyads), farmers played the main role by bearing the risk of unsold produce. Dyads involving 
specialised organic buyers were in the upper band of relational contracting due to 
increasing complexity of transactions and asset specific investment by buyers.  
Despite their efforts to incentivise compliance, the organic wholesaler and retailer were still 
vulnerable to environmental and behavioural risk. They both stated that they were unable 
to expand business due to uncertain supplies. Internal enforcement measures were not 
sufficient to address behavioural risks in the absence of shared assets and in the presence of 
alternative buyers. Consequently, buyers were reluctant to invest in storage, processing and 
certification due to possible hold-up problems. 
“I am confident of raising capital from financial institutions. But I cannot take a risk 
as the volume of supply is small and uncertain. A hotel approached me for organic 
fresh vegetable but the contract did not materialise because I could not ensure 
consistent supply” (organic retailer). 
“Due to uncertainty of supply, I had to stop supplying a supermarket. I am also 
unable to enter into a supply contract with the supermarket and have to sell on a 
commission basis” (organic wholesaler). 
The organic wholesaler and retailer sourced produce from cooperatives and individual 
growers. Contracting with cooperatives helped to reduce unit transaction costs for buyers 
and producers. Collective marketing also helped in meeting compliance requirements 
through peer monitoring in the absence of formal certification. However, it did not solve the 
problem of uncertain supply as producer groups and cooperatives had not succeeded in 
coordinating members’ production plans to meet buyer requirements. As a consequence, 
uncertainty persisted despite group contracting, and buyers with high asset specific 
investment (such as the organic retailer and the hotel) integrated backwards into 
production. 
“I had to start my own farm due to uncertainty of supply as I need consistent supply 
for my restaurant” (organic retailer). 
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The hotel cited inability to demonstrate organic compliance as another reason for its 
decision to integrate backwards into production. 
“Lack of assured supply of organic produce and organic certification forced us to start 
our own farm” (purchase manager of the hotel). 
Vertical integration helped the organic retailer to stabilise supply and to continue buying 
from other suppliers. However, backward integration into production by the hotel displaced 
transactions with small farmers. Uncertainty of supply also forced a supermarket to reduce 
its purchases from a cooperative and the relationship collapsed due to high unit transaction 
costs. Other dyads were discounted by farmers who were dissatisfied with the terms offered 
by buyers or their reluctance to accept more produce at times of peak production. 
“I am not happy with the premium offered by organic buyers because their base price 
is the wholesale market price. I do not normally supply to them except when they 
approach me with better offer during short-supply from their regular sources” 
(farmer 6). 
 “I supplied to a specialised asparagus buyer for two years. I came to know the huge 
difference between his buying and selling price and stopped supplying to him” 
(farmer 4). 
 “The organic retailer could not absorb all of my produce, so I stopped supplying him” 
(farmer 4). 
4 Conclusions and recommendations 
Organic vegetable farmers were able to trade small volumes in informal markets because 
unit transaction costs were low due to inexpensive physical access and non-complex 
transactions. Improving road access may extend informal market opportunities to more 
smallholders but this market will remain small and easily saturated.  
Farmers were denied opportunities to engage in spot market trading because the municipal 
wholesale market did not differentiate organic produce. Standards and rules for organic 
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produce could facilitate spot market trading. However, third party certification is costly and 
may not be economically feasible for smallholders selling to domestic markets where few 
buyers are willing to pay the required premiums. Less expensive methods of certification 
such as Participatory Guarantee Systems (PGS) have been successfully trialled in several 
developing countries (Fonseca, Wilkinson, Egelyng, & Mascarenhas, 2008; Nelson, Gómez 
Tovar, Schwentesius Rindermann, & Gómez Cruz, 2010) and warrant consideration by the 
Department of Agriculture and organic farmer groups in collaboration with specialised 
organic buyers. 
Farmers and buyers were also unable to engage in conventional contracts owing to 
uncertain yields and weak external enforcement. Extension staff could help farmer groups 
to develop well-coordinated production plans. Similarly, an effective certification scheme 
should encourage investment in on-farm technologies that reduce yield variability. Buyers 
are also more likely to brand and promote organic produce that is certified, and more so if 
the legal system gives them affordable and effective protection against side-selling by 
farmers.  
Despite these missing dyads, the supply chain for organic fresh vegetables in Kathmandu is 
reasonably robust because smallholders with different risk-reward profiles can, and do, 
engage in a variety of relational contracts with buyers. These contracts addressed increasing 
transaction costs associated with asset specific and complex transactions that required 
higher levels of coordination and internal enforcement. Enforcement mechanisms included 
extension advice, recurrent transactions and the payment of premiums and bonuses.  
Even so, relational contracts were vulnerable to uncertainties arising from environmental 
and behavioural risk. Behavioural risk stemmed mostly from side-selling by farmers who 
could get better prices from alternative buyers. Improved production planning and on-farm 
technology, better information sharing and agreement on ex post adaptation to price 
changes would help to strengthen relational contracting and perhaps encourage buyers to 
make the asset specific investments needed to differentiate fresh organic vegetables. 
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As matters stand, buyers selling into premium organic markets tend to integrate into 
production activities in order to improve consistency of supply and compliance with organic 
standards. Shared investment in labelling and promotion by farmers and their buyers could 
provide another avenue for the internal enforcement of relational contracts, but will most 
likely require prior investment in a PGS or third-party certification scheme. 
Given their small size, it is unlikely that individual farmers will lead innovation in this supply 
chain. Leadership is more likely to come from farmer groups and specialised organic buyers 
that handle relatively large volumes of organic produce. Government agencies could play a 
key role in building a more robust chain by helping these parties to deepen and extend their 
relational contracts, by establishing standards and rules for organic produce traded in 
municipal spot markets, and by facilitating farmer marketing groups and advising them on 
production plans, technology and participatory guarantee systems. The government could 
also improve physical infrastructure, mandate extension staff to facilitate and witness 
contracts, and provide contractual parties with easy access to legal recourse for small 
claims.  
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